Belgium – Proposed liberalisation of abortion laws: 12, 14 or 18 weeks – a scientific question or an ethical choice?

The Belgian Minister for Justice, Annelies Verlinden (CD&V), announced in early June that a bill would shortly be tabled to substantially amend the current legislation on abortion. The bill proposes, in particular, to extend the legal time limit for voluntary termination of pregnancy from 12 to 14 weeks of pregnancy, to reduce the mandatory reflection period from six to two days, and to allow abortion up to 18 weeks where the pregnancy is the result of rape. Presented as a compromise within the governing coalition, this reform immediately reignited divisions between the political parties.

For several years now, certain parties and organisations in favour of further liberalising abortion laws in Belgium have been calling for the legal limit to be extended to 18 weeks after conception (i.e. 20 weeks of amenorrhoea, or four and a half months of pregnancy). They base their arguments in particular on the report by the inter-university expert committee (appointed by the previous government) submitted to Parliament in 2023, which recommended such an extension to 18 weeks in order to limit the number of women forced to travel abroad when they exceed the time limit currently permitted in Belgium.

The bill put forward by Minister Verlinden, whilst relaxing the conditions for abortion, nevertheless deviates from this recommendation. By setting the general limit at 14 weeks, the minister appears to consider that, from a certain stage of prenatal development, the interests of the unborn child warrant greater protection. This idea is, moreover, not alien to current Belgian legislation, which is already implicitly based, in certain respects, on a gradual protection of human life before birth.

Fetal sensitivity and protection of the unborn child

This reference to foetal development has been strongly contested by several politicians and experts in favour of extending the legal limit for abortion. The debate has centred in particular on the sensitive issue of foetal pain. In the Flemish press, some have gone so far as to compare the position of CD&V chairman Sammy Mahdi to a form of scientific denialism, accusing him of relying on erroneous data regarding the foetus’s neurological development.

However, contrary to what is sometimes claimed on both sides, the scientific literature does not allow for an absolute consensus on this issue. The majority of studies consider that the neurological structures necessary for a conscious experience of pain are probably not sufficiently developed at 18 weeks’ gestation. Other researchers, however, argue that certain forms of perception or response to nociceptive stimuli may exist at an earlier stage – which explains why the foetus is, from a certain stage onwards, anaesthetised prior to abortion. Scientific caution therefore calls for a distinction to be made between what is firmly established and what remains a matter of debate. In any case, reducing the issue of foetal protection to the sole concern of pain would amount to neglecting other biological and anthropological dimensions of human development.

Anatomical development and methods of abortion

Indeed, at 14 weeks of pregnancy, the unborn child already exhibits a high degree of anatomical organisation: its limbs are formed, its fingers are distinct, its face is recognisable, and it performs numerous spontaneous movements. At 18 weeks, its development continues rapidly: the growth of the nervous system intensifies, movements become more coordinated, and the mother may sometimes begin to feel them.

Although these observations alone do not determine what the law should be, they show that the debate is not simply about an undifferentiated biological reality. The degree of foetal development also influences the method of abortion: after 14 weeks, the procedure typically involves dilation and evacuation (D&E), which may require the fragmentation of the foetus.

Science, ethics and democracy

This discussion ties in with another issue raised by the criticism levelled at the government: does the expert committee’s report truly represent a scientific consensus that the legislature is bound to follow? Such a claim seems excessive. Science can certainly inform the debate by describing prenatal development, medical risks or the social consequences of the various legislative options. However, it cannot, on its own, answer the fundamental normative question: at what stage does a society consider that a human being before birth deserves special legal protection? Whilst science can inform the discussion in this regard – particularly regarding the reality of foetal development – in a democracy, this question is first and foremost – and ultimately – a matter of ethical, philosophical and political choices.

Beyond government compromises and partisan clashes, the announced reform thus serves as a reminder that the debate on abortion cannot be reduced to a conflict between ‘science’ and ‘ideology’. The disagreements actually centre on fundamental anthropological questions: what value should be accorded to human life before birth? What criteria justify its protection? And how can this protection be reconciled with support for women and couples facing an unplanned pregnancy, particularly in a context of precariousness? These are all questions that demand a genuine democratic debate, grounded both in science and in a clear ethical framework.